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Abstract
This note studies structural aspects concerning Optimal Positional Strategies (OPSs) in Mean
Payoff Games (MPGs), it’s a contribution to understanding the relationship between OPSs in
MPGs and Small Energy-Progress Measures (SEPMs) in reweighted Energy Games (EGs). Firstly,
it is observed that the space of all OPSs, optΓΣM0 , admits a unique complete decomposition
in terms of so-called extremal-SEPMs in reweighted EGs; this points out what we called the
“Energy-Lattice X ∗Γ of optΓΣM0 ”. Secondly, it is offered a pseudo-polynomial total-time re-
cursive procedure for enumerating (w/o repetitions) all the elements of X ∗Γ , and for computing
the corresponding partitioning of optΓΣM0 . It is observed that the corresponding recursion tree
defines an additional lattice B∗Γ, whose elements are certain subgames Γ′ ⊆ Γ that we call ba-
sic subgames. The extremal-SEPMs of a given MPG Γ coincide with the least-SEPMs of the
basic subgames of Γ; so, X ∗Γ is the energy-lattice comprising all and only the least-SEPMs of
the basic subgames of Γ. The complexity of the proposed enumeration for both B∗Γ and X ∗Γ
is O(|V |3|E|W |B∗Γ|) total time and O(|V ||E|)+Θ
(
|E||B∗Γ|
)
working space. Finally, it is con-
structed an MPG Γ for which |B∗Γ|> |X ∗Γ |, this proves that B∗Γ and X ∗Γ are not isomorphic.
Keywords: Mean Payoff Games, Optimal Strategy Synthesis, Pseudo-Polynomial Time,
Energy Games, Small Energy-Progress Measures.
1. Introduction
A Mean Payoff Game (MPG) is a two-player infinite game Γ = (V,E,w,〈V0,V1〉), that is
played on a finite weighted directed graph, denoted GΓ , (V,E,w), where w : E →Z, the vertices
of which are partitioned into two classes, V0 and V1, according to the player to which they belong.
At the beginning of the game a pebble is placed on some vertex vs ∈V , then the two players,
named Player 0 and Player 1, move it along the arcs ad infinitum. Assuming the pebble is cur-
rently on some v∈V0, then Player 0 chooses an arc (v,v′)∈E going out of v and moves the pebble
to the destination vertex v′. Similarly, if the pebble is currently on some v∈V1, it is Player 1’s turn
to choose an outgoing arc. The infinite sequence vs,v,v′ . . . of all the encountered vertices forms a
play. In order to play well, Player 0 wants to maximize the limit inferior of the long-run average
weight of the traversed arcs, i.e., to maximize liminfn→∞ 1n ∑n−1i=0 w(vi,vi+1), whereas Player 1
wants to minimize the limsupn→∞ 1n ∑n−1i=0 w(vi,vi+1). Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski (1979) proved
that each vertex v admits a value, denoted valΓ(v), that each player can secure by means of a
memoryless (or positional) strategy, i.e., one depending only on the current vertex position and
not on the previous choices.
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Solving an MPG consists in computing the values of all vertices (Value Problem) and, for
each player, a positional strategy that secures such values to that player (Optimal Strategy Syn-
thesis). The corresponding decision problem lies in NP∩ coNP (Zwick and Paterson, 1996) and
it was later shown to be in UP∩ coUP (Jurdzin´ski, 1998).
The problem of devising efficient algorithms for solving MPGs has been studied extensively
in the literature. The first milestone was settled in Gurvich et al. (1988), in which it was offered
an exponential time algorithm for solving a slightly wider class of MPGs called Cyclic Games.
Afterwards, Zwick and Paterson (1996) devised the first deterministic procedure for computing
values in MPGs, and optimal strategies securing them, within a pseudo-polynomial time and
polynomial space. In particular, it was established an O(|V |3|E|W ) upper bound for the time
complexity of the Value Problem, as well as an upper bound of O(|V |4|E|W log(|E|/|V |)) for
that of Optimal Strategy Synthesis (Zwick and Paterson, 1996).
Several research efforts have been spent in studying quantitative extensions of infinite games
for modeling quantitative aspects of reactive systems, e.g., the Energy Games (EGs) (Chakrabarti et al.,
2003; Bouyer et al., 2008; Brim et al., 2011). These studies unveiled interesting connections be-
tween EGs and MPGs; and by relying on these techniques, recently the worst-cast time com-
plexity of the Value Problem and Optimal Strategy Synthesis was given an improved pseudo-
polynomial upper bound (Comin and Rizzi, 2015, 2016a); those works focused on offering a
simple proof of the improved upper bound. However, the running time of the proposed al-
gorithm turned out to be also Ω(|V |2|E|W ), the actual time complexity being Θ
(
|V |2|E|W +
∑v∈V degΓ(v) · ℓ0Γ(v)
)
, where ℓ0Γ(v) ≤ (|V | − 1)|V |W denotes the total number of times that a
certain energy-lifting operator δ (·,v) is applied to any v ∈ V . A way to overcome this issue
was found in Comin and Rizzi (2016b), where a novel algorithmic scheme, named Jumping, was
introduced; by tackling on some further regularities of the problem, the estimate on the pseudo-
polynomial time complexity of MPGs was reduced to: O(|E| log |V |)+Θ
(
∑v∈V degΓ(v) ·ℓ1Γ(v)
)
,
where, for every v ∈ V , ℓ1Γ(v) is the total number of applications of δ (·,v) that are made by the
algorithm; ℓ1Γ ≤ (|V | − 1)|V |W (worst-case, but experimentally ℓ1Γ ≪ ℓ0Γ; see Comin and Rizzi
(2016b)), and the working space is Θ(|V |+ |E|). With this, the pseudo-polynomiality was con-
fined to depend solely on the total number ℓ1Γ of required energy-liftings.
Contribution. This work studies the relationship between Optimal Positional Strategies (OPSs)
in MPGs and Small Energy-Progress Measures (SEPMs) in reweighted EGs. Actually this paper
is an extended and revised version of Section 5 in Comin and Rizzi (2015). Here, we offer:
1. An Energy-Lattice Decomposition of the Space of Optimal Positional Strategies in MPGs.
Let’s denote by optΓΣM0 the space of all the optimal positional strategies in a given MPG Γ. What
allows the algorithms given in Comin and Rizzi (2015, 2016a,b) to compute at least one σ∗0 ∈
optΓΣM0 is a compatibility relation that links optimal arcs in MPGs to arcs that are compatible
w.r.t. least-SEPMs in reweighted EGs. The family EΓ of all SEPMs of a given EG Γ forms a
complete finite lattice, the Energy-Lattice of the EG Γ. Firstly, we observe that even though
compatibility w.r.t. least-SEPMs in reweighted EGs implies optimality of positional strategies
in MPGs (see Theorem 3), the converse doesn’t hold generally (see Proposition 5). Thus a
natural question was whether compatibility w.r.t. SEPMs was really appropriate to capture (e.g.,
to provide a recursive enumeration of) the whole optΓΣM0 and not just a proper subset of it.
Partially motivated by this question we explored on the relationship between optΓΣM0 and EΓ.
In Theorem 4, it is observed a unique complete decomposition of optΓΣM0 which is expressed
in terms of so called extremal-SEPMs in reweighted EGs. This points out what we called the
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“Energy-Lattice X ∗Γ associated to optΓΣM0 ”, the family of all the extremal-SEPMs of a given
MPG Γ. So, compatibility w.r.t. SEPMs actually turns out to be appropriate for constructing
the whole optΓΣM0 ; but an entire lattice X ∗Γ of extremal-SEPMs then arises (and not just the
least-SEPM, which turns out to account only for the join/top component of optΓΣM0 ).
2. A Recursive Enumeration of Extremal-SEPMs and Optimal Positional Strategies in MPGs.
It is offered a pseudo-polynomial total time recursive procedure for enumerating (w/o repetitions)
all the elements of X ∗Γ , and for computing the associated partitioning of optΓΣM0 . This shows
that the above mentioned compatibility relation is appropriate so to extend the algorithm given
in Comin and Rizzi (2016b), recursively, in order to compute the whole optΓΣM0 and X ∗Γ . It is
observed that the corresponding recursion tree actually defines an additional lattice B∗Γ, whose
elements are certain subgames Γ′ ⊆ Γ that we call basic subgames. The extremal-SEPMs of
a given Γ coincide with the least-SEPMs of the basic subgames of Γ; so, X ∗Γ is the energy-
lattice comprising all and only the least-SEPMs of the basic subgames of Γ. The total time
complexity of the proposed enumeration for both B∗Γ and X ∗Γ is O(|V |3|E|W |B∗Γ|), it works in
space O(|V ||E|)+Θ
(
|E||B∗Γ|
)
. An example of MPG Γ for which |B∗Γ|> |X ∗Γ | ends this paper.
Organization. The following Section 2 introduces some notation and provides the required back-
ground on infinite 2-player pebble games and related algorithmic results. In Section 3, a suit-
able relation between values, optimal strategies, and certain reweighting operations is recalled
from Comin and Rizzi (2015, 2016a). Section 4 offers a unique and complete energy-lattice de-
composition of optΓΣM0 . Finally, Section 5 provides a recursive enumeration of X ∗Γ and the
corresponding partitioning of optΓΣM0 .
2. Notation and Preliminaries
We denote by N, Z, Q the set of natural, integer, and rational numbers. It will be sufficient to
consider integral intervals, e.g., [a,b], {z ∈ Z | a ≤ z ≤ b} and [a,b), {z ∈ Z | a ≤ z < b} for
any a,b ∈ Z. Our graphs are directed and weighted on the arcs; thus, if G = (V,E,w) is a graph,
then every arc e ∈ E is a triplet e = (u,v,we), where we = w(u,v) ∈ Z. Let W , maxe∈E |we| be
the maximum absolute weight. Given a vertex u ∈V , the set of its successors is NoutΓ (u) , {v ∈
V | (u,v) ∈ E}, and the set of its predecessors is NinΓ (u) , {v ∈ V | (v,u) ∈ E}. Let degΓ(v) ,
|NinΓ (v)|+ |NoutΓ (v)|. A path is a sequence v0v1 . . .vn . . . such that ∀i∈[n] (vi,vi+1) ∈ E . Let V ∗
be the set of all (possibly empty) finite paths. A simple path is a finite path v0v1 . . .vn having
no repetitions, i.e., for any i, j ∈ [0,n] it holds vi 6= v j if i 6= j. A cycle is a path v0v1 . . .vn−1vn
such that v0 . . .vn−1 is simple and vn = v0. The average weight of a cycle v0 . . .vn is w(C)/|C|=
1
n ∑n−1i=0 w(vi,vi+1). A cycle C = v0v1 . . .vn is reachable from v in G if there is some path p in G
such that p∩C 6= /0.
An arena is a tuple Γ = (V,E,w,〈V0,V1〉) where GΓ , (V,E,w) is a finite weighted directed
graph and (V0,V1) is a partition of V into the set V0 of vertices owned by Player 0, and V1 owned
by Player 1. It is assumed that GΓ has no sink, i.e., ∀v∈V NoutΓ (v) 6= /0; we remark that GΓ is
not required to be a bipartite graph on colour classes V0 and V1. A subarena Γ′ (or subgame)
of Γ is any arena Γ′ = (V ′,E ′,w′,〈V ′0,V ′1〉) such that: V ′ ⊆ V , ∀i∈{0,1}V ′i = V ′ ∩Vi, E ′ ⊆ E , and
∀e∈E
′
w′e = we. Given S ⊆ V , the subarena of Γ induced by S is denoted Γ|S , its vertex set is S
and its edge set is E ′ = {(u,v) ∈ E | u,v ∈ S}. A game on Γ is played for infinitely many rounds
by two players moving a pebble along the arcs of GΓ. At the beginning of the game the pebble
is found on some vertex vs ∈ V , which is called the starting position of the game. At each turn,
assuming the pebble is currently on a vertex v∈Vi (for i= 0,1), Player i chooses an arc (v,v′)∈ E
and then the next turn starts with the pebble on v′. Below, Fig. 1 depicts an example arena Γex.
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Figure 1: An arena Γex = 〈V,E,w,(V0,V1)〉. Here, V =
{A,B,C,D,E,F,G} and E = {(A,B,+3),(B,C,+3),(C,D,−5),
(D,A,−5),(E,A,0),(E,C,0),(E,F,0),(E,G,0),(F,G,−5),(G,F,+3)}. Also, V0 =
{B,D,E,G} is colored in red, while V1 = {A,C,F} is filled in blue.
A play is any infinite path v0v1 . . .vn . . . ∈ V ω in Γ. For any i ∈ {0,1}, a strategy of Player i
is any function σi : V ∗×Vi → V such that for every finite path p′v in GΓ, where p′ ∈ V ∗ and
v ∈ Vi, it holds that (v,σi(p′,v)) ∈ E . A strategy σi of Player i is positional (or memoryless) if
σi(p,vn) = σi(p′,v′m) for every finite paths pvn = v0 . . .vn−1vn and p′v′m = v′0 . . .v′m−1v′m in GΓ
such that vn = v′m ∈ Vi. The set of all the positional strategies of Player i is denoted by ΣMi . A
play v0v1 . . .vn . . . is consistent with a strategy σ ∈ Σi if v j+1 = σ(v0v1 . . .v j) whenever v j ∈Vi.
Given a starting position vs ∈V , the outcome of two strategies σ0 ∈ Σ0 and σ1 ∈ Σ1, denoted
outcomeΓ(vs,σ0,σ1), is the unique play that starts at vs and is consistent with both σ0 and σ1.
Given a memoryless strategy σi ∈ ΣMi of Player i in Γ, then G(σi,Γ) = (V,Eσi ,w) is the graph
obtained from GΓ by removing all the arcs (v,v′) ∈ E such that v ∈Vi and v′ 6= σi(v); we say that
G(σi,Γ) is obtained from GΓ by projection w.r.t. σi.
For any weight function w′ : E → Z, the reweighting of Γ = (V,E,w,〈V0,V1〉) w.r.t. w′ is the
arena Γw′ =(V,E,w′,〈V0,V1〉). Also, for w : E →Z and any ν ∈Z, we denote by w+ν the weight
function w′ defined as ∀e∈Ew′e , we+ν . Indeed, we shall consider reweighted games of the form
Γw−q, for some q ∈Q. Notice that the corresponding weight function w′ : E →Q : e 7→ we−q is
rational, while we required the weights of the arcs to be always integers. To overcome this issue,
it is sufficient to re-define Γw−q by scaling all weights by a factor equal to the denominator of
q ∈Q; i.e., when q ∈Q, say q = N/D for gcd(N,D) = 1 we define Γw−q , ΓD·w−N . This rescal-
ing operation doesn’t change the winning regions of the corresponding games, let’s denote this
equivalence as Γw−q ∼= ΓD·w−N , and it has the significant advantage of allowing for a discussion
(and an algorithmics) which is strictly based on integer weights.
2.1. Mean Payoff Games
A Mean Payoff Game (MPG) (Brim et al., 2011; Zwick and Paterson, 1996; Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski,
1979) is a game played on some arena Γ for infinitely many rounds by two opponents, Player 0
gains a payoff defined as the long-run average weight of the play, whereas Player 1 loses that
value. Formally, the Player 0’s payoff of a play v0v1 . . .vn . . . in Γ is defined as follows:
MP0(v0v1 . . .vn . . .), liminf
n→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
i=0
w(vi,vi+1).
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The value secured by a strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 in a vertex v is defined as:
valσ0(v), inf
σ1∈Σ1
MP0
(
outcomeΓ(v,σ0,σ1)
)
,
Notice that payoffs and secured values can be defined symmetrically for the Player 1 (i.e., by
interchanging the symbol 0 with 1 and inf with sup).
Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski (1979) proved that each vertex v ∈V
admits a unique value, denoted valΓ(v), which each player can secure by means of a memoryless
(or positional) strategy. Moreover, uniform positional optimal strategies do exist for both players,
in the sense that for each player there exist at least one positional strategy which can be used to
secure all the optimal values, independently with respect to the starting position vs. Thus, for
every MPG Γ, there exists a strategy σ0 ∈ ΣM0 such that ∀v∈Vvalσ0(v) ≥ valΓ(v), and there
exists a strategy σ1 ∈ ΣM1 such that ∀v∈Vvalσ1(v) ≤ valΓ(v). The (optimal) value of a vertex
v ∈V in the MPG Γ is given by:
valΓ(v) = sup
σ0∈Σ0
valσ0(v) = inf
σ1∈Σ1
valσ1(v).
Thus, a strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 is optimal if valσ0(v) = valΓ(v) for all v ∈ V . We denote optΓΣM0 ,{
σ0 ∈ ΣM0 (Γ) | ∀v∈V valΓσ0(v) = val
Γ(v)
}
. A strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 is said to be winning for Player 0
if ∀v∈Vvalσ0(v) ≥ 0, and σ1 ∈ Σ1 is winning for Player 1 if valσ1(v) < 0. Correspondingly, a
vertex v ∈ V is a winning starting position for Player 0 if valΓ(v) ≥ 0, otherwise it is winning
for Player 1. The set of all winning starting positions of Player i is denoted by Wi for i ∈ {0,1}.
A refined formulation of the determinacy theorem is offered in Bjo¨rklund et al. (2004).
Theorem 1 (Bjo¨rklund et al. (2004)). Let Γ be an MPG and let {Ci}mi=1 be a partition (called er-
godic) of its vertices into m≥ 1 classes each one having the same optimal value νi ∈Q. Formally,
V =
⊔m
i=1 Ci and ∀i∈[m]∀v∈CivalΓi(v) = νi, where Γi , Γ|Ci .
Then, Player 0 has no vertices with outgoing arcs leading from Ci to C j whenever νi < ν j ,
and Player 1 has no vertices with outgoing arcs leading from Ci to C j whenever νi > ν j;
moreover, there exist σ0 ∈ ΣM0 and σ1 ∈ ΣM1 such that:
– If the game starts from any vertex in Ci, then σ0 secures a gain at least νi to Player 0 and
σ1 secures a loss at most νi to Player 1;
– Any play that starts from Ci always stays in Ci, if it is consistent with both strategies σ0,σ1,
i.e., if Player 0 plays according to σ0, and Player 1 according to σ1.
A finite variant of MPGs is well-known in the literature (Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski, 1979;
Zwick and Paterson, 1996; Brim et al., 2011), where the game stops as soon as a cyclic se-
quence of vertices is traversed. It turns out that this is equivalent to the infinite game formu-
lation (Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski, 1979), in the sense that the values of an MPG are in a strong
relationship with the average weights of its cycles, as in the next lemma.
Proposition 1 (Brim, et al. Brim et al. (2011)). Let Γ be an MPG. For all ν ∈Q, for all σ0 ∈ ΣM0 ,
and for all v ∈ V, the value valσ0(v) is greater than ν iff all cycles C reachable from v in the
projection graph GΓσ0 have an average weight w(C)/|C| greater than ν .
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the memoryless determinacy of MPGs. We remark
that a proposition which is symmetric to Proposition 1 holds for Player 1 as well: for all ν ∈Q,
for all positional strategies σ1 ∈ ΣM1 of Player 1, and for all vertices v ∈V , the value valσ1(v) is
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less than ν iff if all cycles reachable from v in the projection graph GΓσ1 have an average weight
less than ν . Also, it is well-known (Brim et al., 2011; Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski, 1979) that
each value valΓ(v) is contained within the following set of rational numbers:
SΓ =
{
N/D | D ∈ [1, |V |], N ∈ [−D ·W,D ·W ]
}
.
Notice, |SΓ| ≤ |V |2W .
The present work focuses on the algorithmics of the following classical problem:
– Optimal Strategy Synthesis. Compute an optimal positional strategy for Player 0 in Γ.
Also, in Section 5 we shall consider the problem of computing the whole optΓΣM0 :
– Optimal Strategy Enumeration. Provide a listing1 of all the optimal positional strategies of
Player 0 in the MPG Γ.
2.2. Energy Games and Small Energy-Progress Measures
An Energy Game (EG) is a game that is played on an arena Γ for infinitely many rounds by
two opponents, where the goal of Player 0 is to construct an infinite play v0v1 . . .vn . . . such that
for some initial credit c ∈ N the following holds: c+∑ ji=0 w(vi,vi+1) ≥ 0 , for all j ≥ 0. Given
an initial credit c ∈ N, a play v0v1 . . .vn . . . is winning for Player 0 if it satisfies (1), otherwise
it is winning for Player 1. A vertex v ∈ V is a winning starting position for Player 0 if there
exists an initial credit c ∈N and a strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 such that, for every strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1, the play
outcomeΓ(v,σ0,σ1) is winning for Player 0. As in the case of MPGs, the EGs are memoryless
determined Brim et al. (2011), i.e., for every v∈V , either v is winning for Player 0 or v is winning
for Player 1, and (uniform) memoryless strategies are sufficient to win the game. In fact, as shown
in the next lemma, the decision problems of MPGs and EGs are intimately related.
Proposition 2 (Brim et al. (2011)). Let Γ be an arena. For all threshold ν ∈Q, for all vertices
v ∈ V, Player 0 has a strategy in the MPG Γ that secures value at least ν from v if and only if,
for some initial credit c ∈N, Player 0 has a winning strategy from v in the reweighted EG Γw−ν .
In this work we are especially interested in the Minimum Credit Problem (MCP) for EGs: for
each winning starting position v, compute the minimum initial credit c∗ = c∗(v) such that there
exists a winning strategy σ0 ∈ ΣM0 for Player 0 starting from v. A fast pseudo-polynomial time
deterministic procedure for solving MCPs comes from Brim et al. (2011).
Theorem 2 (Brim et al. (2011)). There exists a deterministic algorithm for solving the MCP
within O(|V | |E|W ) pseudo-polynomial time, on any input EG (V,E,w,〈V0,V1〉).
The algorithm mentioned in Theorem 2 is the Value-Iteration algorithm (Brim et al., 2011).
Its rationale relies on the notion of Small Energy-Progress Measures (SEPMs).
2.3. Energy-Lattices of Small Energy-Progress Measures
Small-Energy Progress Measures are bounded, non-negative and integer-valued functions
that impose local conditions to ensure global properties on the arena, in particular, witnessing
that Player 0 has a way to enforce conservativity (i.e., non-negativity of cycles) in the resulting
1The listing has to be exhaustive (i.e., each element is listed eventually) and without repetitions (i.e., no element is
listed twice).
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game’s graph. Recovering standard notation, see e.g. Brim et al. (2011), let us denote CΓ = {n∈
N | n ≤ (|V |− 1)W}∪{⊤} and let  be the total order on CΓ defined as: x  y iff either y = ⊤
or x,y ∈ N and x ≤ y. In order to cast the minus operation to range over CΓ, let us consider an
operator ⊖ : CΓ×Z→ CΓ defined as follows:
a⊖ b ,
{
max(0,a− b), if a 6=⊤ and a− b≤ (|V |− 1)W ;
a⊖ b =⊤, otherwise.
Given an EG Γ on vertex set V = V0 ∪V1, a function f : V → CΓ is a Small Energy-Progress
Measure (SEPM) for Γ if and only if the following two conditions are met:
1. if v ∈V0, then f (v) f (v′)⊖w(v,v′) for some (v,v′) ∈ E;
2. if v ∈V1, then f (v) f (v′)⊖w(v,v′) for all (v,v′) ∈ E .
The values of a SEPM, i.e., the elements of the image f (V ), are called the energy levels of f .
It is worth to denote by V f = {v ∈V | f (v) 6=⊤} the set of vertices having finite energy. Given a
SEPM f : V →CΓ and a vertex v∈V0, an arc (v,v′)∈ E is said to be compatible with f whenever
f (v) f (v′)⊖w(v,v′); otherwise (v,v′) is said to be incompatible with f . Moreover, a positional
strategy σ0 ∈ ΣM0 is said to be compatible with f whenever: ∀v∈V0 if σ0(v) = v′ then (v,v′) ∈ E is
compatible with f ; otherwise, σ0 is incompatible with f .
It is well-known that the family of all the SEPMs of a given Γ forms a complete (finite)
lattice, which we denote by EΓ call it the Energy-Lattice of Γ. Therefore, we shall consider:
EΓ ,
(
{ f : V → CΓ | f is SEPM of Γ},⊑),
where for any two SEPMs f ,g define f ⊑ g iff ∀v ∈V f (v) g(v). Notice that, whenever f and
g are SEPMs, then so is the minimum function defined as: ∀v∈V h(v), min{ f (v),g(v)}. This fact
allows one to consider the least SEPM, namely, the unique SEPM f ∗ : V → CΓ such that, for any
other SEPM g : V → CΓ, the following holds: ∀v∈V f ∗(v) g(v). Thus, EΓ is a complete lattice.
So, EΓ enjoys of Knaster–Tarski Theorem, which states that the set of fixed-points of a monotone
function on a complete lattice is again a complete lattice.
Also concerning SEPMs, we shall rely on the following lemmata. The first one relates
SEPMs to the winning region W0 of Player 0 in EGs.
Proposition 3 (Brim et al. (2011)). Let Γ be an EG. Then the following hold.
1. If f is any SEPM of the EG Γ and v ∈V f , then v is a winning starting position for Player 0
in the EG Γ. Stated otherwise, V f ⊆W0;
2. If f ∗ is the least SEPM of the EG Γ, and v is a winning starting position for Player 0 in
the EG Γ, then v ∈V f ∗ . Thus, V f ∗ = W0.
The following bound holds on the energy-levels of any SEPM (by definition of CΓ).
Proposition 4. Let Γ be an EG. Let f be any SEPM of Γ.
Then, for every v ∈V either f (v) =⊤ or 0≤ f (v)≤ (|V |− 1)W.
3. Optimal Strategies from Reweightings
It is now recalled a sufficient condition, for a positional strategy to be optimal, which is
expressed in terms of reweighted EGs and their SEPMs.
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Theorem 3 (Comin and Rizzi (2016a)). Let Γ = (V,E,w,〈V0,V1〉) be an MPG. For each u ∈V ,
consider the reweighted EG Γu ∼= Γw−val
Γ(u)
. Let fu : V → CΓu be any SEPM of Γu such that
u ∈V fu (i.e., fu(u) 6=⊤). Moreover, we assume: fu1 = fu2 whenever valΓ(u1) = valΓ(u2).
When u ∈ V0, let v fu ∈ NoutΓ (u) be any vertex such that (u,v fu) ∈ E is compatible with fu in
EG Γu, and consider the positional strategy σ∗0 ∈ ΣM0 defined as follows: ∀u∈V0 σ∗0 (u), v fu .
Then, σ∗0 is an optimal positional strategy for Player 0 in the MPG Γ.
Proof. See the proof of [Theorem 4 in Comin and Rizzi (2016a)]. ✷
Remark 1. Notice that Theorem 3 holds, particularly, when fu is the least SEPM f ∗u of the
reweighted EG Γu. This is because u ∈ V f ∗u always holds for the least SEPM f ∗u of the EG Γu:
indeed, by Proposition 2 and by definition of Γu, then u is a winning starting position for Player 0
in the EG Γu (for some initial credit); thus, by Proposition 3, it follows that u ∈V f ∗u .
4. An Energy-Lattice Decomposition of optΓΣM0
Recall the example arena Γex shown in Fig. 1. It is easy to see that ∀v∈VvalΓex(v) = −1.
Indeed, Γex contains only two cycles, i.e., CL = [A,B,C,D] and CR = [F,G], also notice that
w(CL)/CL = w(CR)/CR =−1. The least-SEPM f ∗ of the reweighted EG Γw+1ex can be computed
by running a Value Iteration (Brim et al., 2011). Taking into account the reweighting w❀ w+1,
as in Fig. 2: f ∗(A) = f ∗(E) = f ∗(G) = 0, f ∗(B) = f ∗(D) = f ∗(F) = 4, and f ∗(C) = 8.
E
0
C
8
B
4
A0
D
4
F
4
G 0
+1 +1
+1
+1
+4 +4
−4−4
−4
+4
Figure 2: The least-SEPM f ∗ of Γw+1ex (energy-levels are depicted in circled boldface). All and
only those arcs of Player 0 that are compatible with f ∗ are (B,C),(D,A),(E,A),(E,G),(G,F)
(thick red arcs).
So, Γex (Fig. 2) implies the following.
Proposition 5. The converse statement of Theorem 3 doesn’t hold; there exist infinitely many
MPGs Γ having at least one σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 which is not compatible with the least-SEPM of Γ.
Proof. Consider the Γex of Fig. 2, and the least-SEPM f ∗ of the EG Γw+1ex . The only vertex
at which Player 0 really has a choice is E . Every arc going out of E is optimal in the MPG
Γex: whatever arc (E,X) ∈ E (for any X ∈ {A,C,F,G}) Player 0 chooses at E , the resulting
payoff equals valΓex(E) = −1. Let f ∗ be the least-SEPM of f ∗ in Γw+1ex . Observe, (E,C) and
(E,F) are not compatible with f ∗ in Γw+1ex , only (E,A) and (E,G) are. For instance, the po-
sitional strategy σ0 ∈ ΣM0 defined as σ0(E) , F , σ0(B) , C, σ0(D) , A, σ0(G) , F ensures a
payoff ∀v∈VvalΓex(v) = −1, but it is not compatible with the least-SEPM f ∗ of Γw+1ex (because
f ∗(E) = 0 < 3 = f ∗(F)⊖w(E,F)). It is easy to turn the Γex of Fig. 2 into a family on infinitely
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many similar examples. ✷
We now aim at strengthening the relationship between optΓΣM0 and the Energy-Lattice EΓ.
For this, we assume wlog ∃ν∈Q∀v∈VvalΓ(v) = ν; this follows from Theorem 1, which allows
one to partition Γ into several domains Γi , Γ|Ci each one satisfying: ∃
νi∈Q∀v∈CivalΓi(v) = νi.
By Theorem 1 we can study optΓiΣ
M
0 , independently w.r.t. optΓ j Σ
M
0 for j 6= i.
We say that an MPG Γ is ν-valued if and only if ∃ν∈Q∀v∈VvalΓ(v) = ν .
Given an MPG Γ and σ0 ∈ ΣM0 (Γ), recall, G(Γ,σ0) , (V,E ′,w′) is obtained from GΓ by
deleting all and only those arcs that are not part of σ0, i.e.,
E ′ ,
{
(u,v) ∈ E | u ∈V0 and v = σ0(u)
}
∪
{
(u,v) ∈ E | u ∈V1
}
,
where each e ∈ E ′ is weighted as in Γ, i.e., w′ : E ′→ Z : e 7→ we.
When G = (V,E,w) is a weighted directed graph, a feasible-potential (FP) for G is any map
pi : V → CG s.t. ∀u∈V∀v∈N
out(u)pi(u)  pi(v)⊖w(u,v). The least-FP pi∗ = pi∗G is the (unique) FP
s.t., for any other FP pi , it holds ∀v∈V pi∗(v)  pi(v). Given G, the Bellman-Ford algorithm can
be used to produce pi∗G in O(|V ||E|) time. Let pi∗G(Γ,σ0) be the least-FP of G(Γ,σ0). Notice, for
every σ0 ∈ ΣM0 , the least-FP pi∗G(Γ,σ0) is actually a SEPM for the EG Γ; still it can differ from the
least-SEPM of Γ, due to σ0. We consider the following family of strategies.
Definition 1 (∆M0 ( f ,Γ)-Strategies). Let Γ = 〈V,E,w,(V0,V1)〉 and let f : V → CΓ be a SEPM
for the EG Γ. Let ∆M0 ( f ,Γ) ⊆ ΣM0 (Γ) be the family of all and only those positional strategies of
Player 0 in Γ s.t. pi∗G(Γ,σ0) coincides with f pointwisely, i.e.,
∆M0 ( f ,Γ) ,
{
σ0 ∈ ΣM0 (Γ) | ∀v∈V pi∗G(Γ,σ0)(v) = f (v)
}
.
We now aim at exploring further on the relationship between EΓ and optΓΣM0 , via ∆M0 ( f ,Γ).
Definition 2 (The Energy-Lattice of optΓΣM0 ). Let Γ be a ν-valued MPG. Let X ⊆ EΓw−ν be a
sublattice of SEPMs of the reweighted EG Γw−ν .
We say that X is an “Energy-Lattice of optΓΣM0 ” iff ∀ f∈X ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ) 6= /0 and the follow-
ing disjoint-set decomposition holds:
optΓΣM0 =
⊔
f∈X
∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ).
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a ν-valued MPG, and let σ∗0 ∈ optΓΣM0 . Then, G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 ) is conservative
(i.e., it contains no negative cycle).
Proof. Let C , (v1 . . . ,vk,v1) by any cycle in G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 ). Since we have σ∗0 ∈ optΓΣM0 and
∀v∈VvalΓ(v) = ν , thus w(C)/k = 1k ∑ki=1 w(vi,vi+1)≥ ν (for vk+1 , v1) by Proposition 1, so that,
assuming w′ , w−ν , then: w′(C)/k = 1k ∑ki=1
(
w(vi,vi+1)−ν
)
= w(C)/k−ν ≥ ν−ν = 0. ✷
Some aspects of the following Proposition 6 rely heavily on Theorem 3: the compatibility
relation comes again into play. Moreover, we observe that Proposition 6 is equivalent to the
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following fact, which provides a sufficient condition for a positional strategy to be optimal. Con-
sider a ν-valued MPG Γ, for some ν ∈ Q, and let σ∗0 ∈ optΓΣM0 . Let σˆ0 ∈ ΣM0 (Γ) be any (not
necessarily optimal) positional strategy for Player 0 in the MPG Γ. Suppose the following holds:
∀v∈V pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0)(v) = pi
∗
G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 )
(v).
Then, by Proposition 6, σˆ0 is an optimal positional strategy for Player 0 in the MPG Γ.
We are thus relying on the same compatibility relation between ΣM0 and SEPMs in reweighted
EGs which was at the base of Theorem 3, aiming at extending Theorem 3 so to describe the whole
optΓΣM0 (and not just the join/top component of it).
Proposition 6. Let the MPG Γ be ν-valued, for some ν ∈Q.
There is at least one Energy-Lattice of optΓΣM0 :
X
∗
Γ , {pi
∗
G(Γw−ν ,σ0) | σ0 ∈ optΓΣ
M
0 }.
Proof. The only non-trivial point to check being: ⊔ f∈X ∗Γ ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν )⊆ optΓΣM0 .
For this, we shall rely on Theorem 3. Let ˆf ∈X ∗Γ and σˆ0 ∈∆M0 ( ˆf ,Γw−ν) be fixed (arbitrarily).
Since ˆf ∈X ∗Γ , then ˆf = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 ) for some σ
∗
0 ∈ optΓΣM0 . Therefore, the following holds:
pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0) =
ˆf = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 ).
Clearly, σˆ0 is compatible with ˆf in the EG Γw−ν , because ˆf = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0). By Lemma 1, since
σ∗0 is optimal, then G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 ) is conservative. Therefore:
V
ˆf =Vpi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ∗0 )
=V.
Notice, σˆ0 satisfies exactly the hypotheses required by Theorem 3. Therefore, σˆ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 .
This proves (*).This also shows optΓΣM0 =
⊔
f∈X ∗Γ ∆
M
0 ( f ,Γw−ν ), and concludes the proof. ✷
Proposition 7. Let the MPG Γ be ν-valued, for some ν ∈Q. Let X ∗Γ 1 and X ∗Γ 2 be two Energy-
Lattices for optΓΣM0 . Then, X ∗Γ 1 = X ∗Γ 2.
Proof. By symmetry, it is sufficient to prove that X ∗Γ 1 ⊆X ∗Γ 2. Let f1 ∈X ∗Γ 1 be fixed (arbitrar-
ily). Then, f1 = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0) for some σˆ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 . Since σˆ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 and since X ∗Γ 2 is an
Energy-Lattices, there exists f2 ∈X ∗Γ 2 s.t. σˆ0 ∈ ∆M0 ( f2,Γw−ν ), which implies pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0) = f2.
Thus, f1 = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σˆ0) = f2. This implies f1 ∈X ∗Γ 2. ✷
The next theorem summarizes the main point of this section.
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a ν-valued MPG, for some ν ∈Q. Then, X ∗Γ , {pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0) |σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 }
is the unique Energy-Lattice of optΓΣM0 .
Proof. By Proposition 6 and Proposition 7. ✷
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Example 1. Consider the MPG Γex, as defined in Fig. 1. Then, X ∗Γex = { f ∗, f1, f2}, where f ∗
is the least-SEPM of the reweighted EG Γw+1ex , and where the following holds: f1(A) = f2(A) =
f ∗(A) = 0; f1(B) = f2(B) = f ∗(B) = 4; f1(C) = f2(C) = f ∗(C) = 8; f1(D) = f2(D) = f ∗(D) =
4; f1(F) = f2(F) = f ∗(F) = 4; f1(G) = f2(G) = f ∗(G) = 0; finally, f ∗(E) = 0, f1(E) = 3,
f2(E) = 7. An illustration of f1 is offered in Fig. 3a (energy-levels are depicted in circled bold-
face). whereas f2 is depicted in Fig. 3b. Notice that f ∗(v)≤ f1(v)≤ f2(v) for every v ∈V, and
this ordering relation is illustrated in Fig. 3.
E
3
C
8
B
4
A0
D
4
F
4
G 0
+1 +1
+1
+1
+4 +4
−4−4
−4
+4
(a) The extremal-SEPM f1 of Γw+1ex
E
7
C
8
B
4
A0
D
4
F
4
G 0
+1 +1
+1
+1
+4 +4
−4−4
−4
+4
(b) The extremal-SEPM f2 of Γw+1ex .
Definition 3. Each element f ∈X ∗Γ is called extremal-SEPM.
The next lemma is the converse of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let the MPG Γ be ν-valued, for some ν ∈Q. Consider any σ0 ∈ ΣM0 (Γ), and assume
that G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is conservative. Then, σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 .
Proof. Let C = (v1, . . . ,vℓv1) any cycle in G(Γ,σ0). Then, the following holds (if vℓ+1 = v1):
w(C)
ℓ =
1
ℓ ∑ℓi=1 w(vi,vi+1) = ν + 1ℓ ∑ℓi=1
(
w(vi,vi+1)−ν
)
≥ ν , where 1ℓ ∑ℓi=1
(
w(vi,vi+1)−ν
)
≥ 0
holds because G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is conservative. By Proposition 1, since w(C)/ℓ ≥ ν for every cycle
C in GΓσ0 , then σ0 ∈ optΓΣ
M
0 . ✷
The following proposition asserts some properties of the extremal-SEPMs.
Proposition 8. Let the MPG Γ be ν-valued, for some ν ∈ Q. Let X ∗Γ be the Energy-Lattice of
optΓΣM0 . Moreover, let f : V → CΓ be a SEPM for the reweighted EG Γw−ν . Then, the following
three properties are equivalent:
1. f ∈X ∗Γ ;
2. There exists σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 s.t. pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0)(v) = f (v) for every v ∈V.
3. V f = W0(Γw−ν) =V and ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ) 6= /0;
Proof of (1 ⇐⇒ 2). Indeed, X ∗Γ = {pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0) | σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 }. ✷
Proof of (1⇒ 3). Assume f ∈X ∗Γ . Since (1 ⇐⇒ 2), there exist σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 s.t. pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0) =
f . Thus, σ0 ∈ ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ), so that ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ) 6= /0. We claim V f = W0(Γw−ν ) = V . Since
∀(v ∈V )valΓ(v) = ν , then W0(Γw−ν) =V by Proposition 2. Next, G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is conservative
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∆M0 ( f ∗,Γw−ν ) = {σ (1)0 ,σ (2)0 }
σ
(1)
0 (B) =C σ
(2)
0 (B) =C
σ
(1)
0 (D) = A σ
(2)
0 (D) = A
σ
(1)
0 (E) = A σ
(2)
0 (E) = G
σ
(1)
0 (G) = F σ
(2)
0 (G) = F
∆M0 ( f1,Γw−ν ) = {σ (3)0 }
σ
(3)
0 (B) =C
σ
(3)
0 (D) = A
σ
(3)
0 (E) = F
σ
(3)
0 (G) = F
∆M0 ( f1,Γw−ν ) = {σ (4)0 }
σ
(4)
0 (B) =C
σ
(4)
0 (D) = A
σ
(4)
0 (E) =C
σ
(4)
0 (G) = F
Figure 3: The decomposition of optΓΣM0 (right), for the MPG Γex, which corresponds to the
Energy-Lattice X ∗Γex = { f ∗, f1, f2} (center) (as in Example 1). Here, f ∗ ≤ f1 ≤ f2. This brings
a lattice D∗Γex of 3 basic subgames of Γex (left).
by Lemma 1. Since G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is conservative and f = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0), then V f = V . Therefore,
V f = W0(Γw−ν ) =V . ✷
Proof of (1⇐ 3). Since ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ) 6= /0, pick some σ0 ∈ ∆M0 ( f ,Γw−ν ); so, f = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0).
Since V f =V and f = pi∗G(Γw−ν ,σ0), then G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is conservative. Since G(Γw−ν ,σ0) is con-
servative, then σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 by Lemma 2. Since f = pi∗G∗ and σ0 ∈ optΓΣM0 , then f ∈ X ∗Γ
because 2⇒ 1. ✷
5. A Recursive Enumeration of X ∗Γ and optΓ
(
ΣM0
)
An enumeration algorithm for a set S provides an exhaustive listing of all the elements of S
(without repetitions). As mentioned in Section 4, by Theorem 1, no loss of generality occurs if
we assume Γ to be ν-valued for some ν ∈Q. One run of the algorithm given in Comin and Rizzi
(2016b) allows one to partition an MPG Γ, into several domains Γi each one being νi-valued
for νi ∈ SΓ; in O(|V |2|E|W ) time and linear space. Still, by Proposition 5, Theorem 3 is not
sufficient for enumerating the whole optΓ(ΣM0 ); it is enough only for ∆M0 ( f ∗ν ,Γw−ν) where f ∗ν is
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the least-SEPM of Γw−ν , which is just the join/top component of optΓ(ΣM0 ). However, thanks to
Theorem 4, we now have a refined description of optΓΣM0 in terms X ∗Γ .
We offer a recursive enumeration of all the extremal-SEPMs, i.e., X ∗Γ , and for computing
the corresponding partitioning of optΓ
(
ΣM0
)
. In order to avoid duplicate elements in the enumer-
ation, the algorithm needs to store a lattice B∗Γ of subgames of Γ, which is related to X ∗Γ . We
assume to have a data-structure TΓ supporting the following operations, given a subarena Γ′ of
Γ: insert(Γ′,TΓ) stores Γ′ into TΓ; contains(Γ′,TΓ) returns T if and only if Γ′ is in TΓ, and F
otherwise. A simple implementation of TΓ goes by indexing NoutΓ′ (v) for each v ∈V (e.g., with a
trie data-structure). This can run in O(|E| log |V |) time, consuming O(|E|) space per stored item.
Similarly, one can index SEPMs in O(|V | log(|V |W )) time and O(|V |) space per stored item.
The listing procedure is named enum(), it takes a ν-valued MPG Γ and goes as follows.
1. Compute the least-SEPM f ∗ of Γ, and print Γ to output. Theorem 3 can be employed at
this stage for enumerating ∆M0 ( f ∗,Γw−ν ): indeed, these are all and only those positional
strategies lying in the Cartesian product of all the arcs (u,v) ∈ E that are compatible with
f ∗ in Γw−ν (because f ∗ is the least-SEPM of Γ).
2. Let St← /0 be an empty stack of vertices.
3. For each uˆ ∈V0, do the following:
• Compute Euˆ ←{(uˆ,v) ∈ E | f ∗(uˆ)≺ f ∗(v)⊖ (w(uˆ,v)−ν)};
• If Euˆ 6= /0, then:
– Let E ′← Euˆ∪{(u,v) ∈ E | u 6= uˆ} and Γ′← (V,E ′,w,〈V0,V1〉).
– If contains(Γ′,TΓ) = F, do the following:
∗ Compute the least-SEPM f ′∗ of Γ′w−ν ;
∗ If V f ′∗ =V :
– Push uˆ on top of St and insert(Γ′,TΓ).
– If contains( f ′∗,TΓ) = F, then insert( f ′∗,TΓ) and print f ′∗.
4. While St 6= /0:
• pop uˆ from St; Let Euˆ ← {(uˆ,v) ∈ E | f ∗(uˆ) ≺ f ∗(v)⊖ (w(uˆ,v)− ν)}, and E ′ ←
Euˆ∪{(u,v) ∈ E | u 6= uˆ}, and Γ′← (V,E ′,w,〈V0,V1〉);
• Make a recursive call to enum() on input Γ′.
Down the recursion tree, when computing least-SEPMs, the children Value-Iterations can amor-
tize by starting from the energy-levels of the parent. The lattice of subgames B∗Γ comprises
all and only those subgames Γ′ ⊆ Γ that are eventually inserted into TΓ at Step (3) of enum();
these are called the basic subgames of Γ. The correctness of enum() follows by Theorem 4 and
Theorem 3. In summary, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. There exists a recursive algorithm for enumerating (w/o repetitions) all elements
of B∗Γ with time-delay2 O(|V |3|E|W ), on any input MPG Γ; moreover, the algorithm works with
O(|V ||E|)+Θ
(
|E||B∗Γ|)
)
space. So, it enumerates X ∗Γ (w/o repetitions) in O
(
|V |3|E|W |B∗Γ|
)
total time, and O(|V ||E|)+Θ
(
|E||B∗Γ|
)
space.
2A listing algorithm has O( f (n)) time-delay when the time spent between any two consecutives is O( f (n)).
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To conclude we observe that B∗Γ and X ∗Γ are not isomorphic as lattices, not even as sets
(the cardinality of B∗Γ can be greater that that of X ∗Γ ). Indeed, there is a surjective antitone
mapping ϕΓ from B∗Γ onto X ∗Γ , (i.e., ϕΓ sends Γ′ ∈B∗Γ to its least-SEPM f ∗Γ′ ∈X ∗Γ ); still, we
can construct instances of MPGs such that |B∗Γ|> |X ∗Γ |, i.e., ϕΓ is not into and B∗Γ, X ∗Γ are not
isomorphic. That would be a case of degeneracy, and an example MPG Γd is given in Fig. 4.
u1
0
u2
0
u31
v1
0
v2
0
v3 1
t
0
u4
0
u5
0
v4
0
v5
0
00
−2
−1
−10
0 0
00
−2
−1
0
0 0
Figure 4: An MPG Γd for which |B∗Γ|> |X ∗Γ |.
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0
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0
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−10
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00
−2
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Figure 5: Two basic subgames Γ1d 6= Γ2d of Γd, having the same least-SEPM f ∗1 = f ∗2 .
In the MPG Γd, Player 0 has to decide how to move only at u3,v3 and t; the remain-
ing moves are forced. The least-SEPM f ∗ of Γd is: f ∗(u3) = 1, f ∗(v3) = 1, f ∗(t) = 0, and
∀x∈VΓd\{u3,v3,t}
f ∗(x) = 0; leading to the following memory-less strategy: σ∗0 (u3) = t, σ∗0 (v3) = t,
σ∗0 (t) = v4. Then, consider the lattice of subgames B∗Γd ; particularly, consider the following two
basic subgames Γ1d , Γ2d : let Γ′d be the arena obtained by removing the arc (t,v4) from Γd ; let Γ1d be
the arena obtained by removing the arc (u3, t) from Γ′d ; let Γ2d be the arena obtained by removing
the arc (v3, t) from Γ′d . See Fig. 5 for an illustration. Next, let f ∗1 , f ∗2 be the least-SEPMs of Γ1d
and Γ2d , respectively; then, f ∗1 (u3) = f ∗2 (u3) = 2, f ∗1 (v3) = f ∗2 (v3) = 2, f ∗1 (t) = f ∗2 (t) = 10, and
∀x∈VΓd\{u3,v3,t}
f ∗1 (x) = f ∗2 (x) = 0. Thus, Γ1d 6= Γ2d , but f ∗1 = f ∗2 ; this proves that Γd is degenerate
and that B∗Γ, X ∗Γ are not isomorphic.
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6. Conclusion
We observed a unique complete decomposition of optΓΣM0 in terms of extremal-SEPMs in
reweighted EGs, also offering a pseudo-polynomial total-time recursive algorithm for enumer-
ating (w/o repetitions) all the elements of X ∗Γ , i.e., all extremal-SEPMs, and for computing the
components of the corresponding partitioning B∗Γ of optΓΣM0 .
It would be interesting to study further properties enjoyed by B∗Γ and X ∗Γ ; and we ask for
more efficient algorithms for enumerating X ∗Γ , e.g., pseudo-polynomial time-delay and polyno-
mial space enumerations.
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